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FINANCIAL EXPENSES: EFFICIENCY VS COMPATIBILITY
Nevia Čičin-Šain*
Summary: Thin-capitalisation rules are rules applied by a number of 
countries in order to protect their national tax base from erosion by 
companies that have a relatively high level of debt compared to eq-
uity. Indeed, the tax treatment of dividend distributions and interest 
payments differs significantly and this in return has an effect on the 
amount of profit a company reports for tax purposes. Country tax rules 
typically allow a deduction for interest paid or payable in arriving at 
the tax measure of profit. The higher the level of debt in a company, 
and thus the amount of interest it pays, the lower its taxable profit will 
be. For this reason, debt is often a more tax efficient method of finance 
than equity. 
In recent years, countries all over the world and even more so the Mem-
ber States of the European Union and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) have been trying to combat the 
negative effect this difference in taxation has on their economies.
However, Member States of the European Union are bound by EU law 
and its provisions on the non-discrimination of companies coming from 
other European Member States.
The focus of this article is Croatian thin-capitalisation rules and their 
effect. The main hypothesis is that Croatian rules on thin-capitalisa-
tion are contrary to EU law. In order to demonstrate this, the author 
first explains what the rules on thin-capitalisation are and what kind 
of thin-capitalisation rules exist. Subsequently, the author analyses 
the relevant provisions of EU law, as well as the case law of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union regarding thin-capitalisation rules. 
This analysis is then applied to the existing Croatian rules and finally 
a conclusion is made as to their potentially discriminatory effect. Fi-
nally, the author examines several ways a potentially incompatible 
thin-capitalisation rule can be made compatible with EU law.
* Nevia Čičin-Šain, DSc, LLM (Université Paris 1 – Panthéon Sorbonne), senior teaching 
assistant, Department for Tax Law, Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb. 
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1 Introduction
Companies can finance their activities either with their own or with 
borrowed capital. There are different theories on the optimal ratio be-
tween debt and equity. However, this choice is not at all tax neutral and 
the way a company is capitalised will often have a significant impact on 
the amount of profit it reports for tax purposes. In an ideal system of 
corporate income taxation, the deduction of all interest payments should 
be allowed since they represent an expense used to generate income. 
However, abuse of this rule can lead to unwanted consequences. As the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (hereinafter: 
OECD) explains: 
Country tax rules typically allow a deduction for interest paid or 
payable in arriving at the tax measure of profit. The higher the 
level of debt in a company, and thus the amount of interest it 
pays, the lower will be its taxable profit. For this reason, debt is 
often a more tax efficient method of finance than equity.1 
Thin capitalisation refers to the situation where a company is fi-
nanced through a relatively high level of debt compared to equity. This 
makes the company rather vulnerable in times of financial crises, since 
the cost of borrowing capital can rise significantly and companies might 
not even be able to close their financial constructions. Even in periods 
when there are no financial crises, the fact that a company is thinly-
capitalised sends a rather negative signal to the markets.
For a State, overindebtedness can lead to a big loss in tax revenues, 
without necessarily gaining any economic profits. Moreover, having in 
mind that financial markets are being globalised, this tax ‘advantage’ giv-
en to national companies can even pour out to other countries. Indeed, 
in purely domestic situations, thin-capitalisation issues do not even pose 
a problem since, from the State’s perspective, an amount that is being 
deducted in the hands of one taxpayer is later added to the tax base of 
the lender and taxed. From a State’s perspective, it is entirely irrelevant 
which company gets taxed. However, the scene changes entirely when 
the lender is a foreign company. 
Even though the Croatian Corporate Income Tax Act (hereinafter: 
CITA)2 does not mention it expressly, the principle of the deductibility of 
financial charges derives from the general principle according to which 
the tax base is determined. The corporate tax base in Croatia is the dif-
1 OECD ‘Thin Capitalisation Legislation: A Background Paper for Country Tax Administra-
tions’ (OECD 2012) 3.
2 Corporate Income Tax Act (Official Gazette 177/04, 90/05, 57/06, 146/08, 80/10, 
22/12, 148/13, 143/14) (Croatia).
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ference between revenue and expenditure assessed in the profit and loss 
statement under the accounting rules, which is then increased and re-
duced by tax-specific items under the corporate tax provisions. Therefore, 
financial charges, parts of which are interest payments, are expenses 
that need to be included when calculating the tax base. 
However, the legislator decided to limit the deduction of interest pay-
ments in some cases. This might seem contradictory to the principle cited 
above, or contradictory to the fact that current monetary policy encour-
ages indebtedness. Prior to exploring the mechanisms for limiting the 
deductibility of financial charges, we shall briefly give the reasons why 
the legislator decided to introduce them. 
2 Different types of thin-capitalisation rules
Thin-capitalisation rules are rules that aim to stop the erosion of the 
corporate tax base. The first large studies regarding rules on limiting the 
deductibility of financial expenses were conducted by the OECD in 19873 
and by the International Fiscal Association (IFA) in 19944 and 1996.5 This 
topic was recently brought up again in the scope of a report on base ero-
sion and profit shifting issued by the OECD6 and in a Council Directive 
of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that 
directly affect the functioning of the internal market.7 
In order to better understand and analyse the Croatian rules on 
thin-capitalisation, it could be useful to situate them on the horizon of 
3 OECD, ‘Thin Capitalization: Taxation of Entertainers, Artistes and Sportsmen (Issues in 
International Taxation, OECD 1987).
4 IFA Cahiers, ‘Deductibility of Interest and Other Financing Charges in Computing In-
come’ (IFA 1994) vol 79a.
5 IFA Cahiers, ‘International Aspects of Thin Capitalization’ (IFA 1996) vol 81b.
6 OECD, ‘Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting’ (OECD 2013). In Action 4, head-
ed ‘Limit base erosion via interest deductions and other financial payments’ it is stated: 
‘Develop recommendations regarding best practices in the design of rules to prevent base 
erosion through the use of interest expense, for example through the use of related-party 
and third-party debt to achieve excessive interest deductions or to finance the production of 
exempt or deferred income, and other financial payments that are economically equivalent 
to interest payments. The work will evaluate the effectiveness of different types of limita-
tions. In connection with and in support of the foregoing work, transfer pricing guidance 
will also be developed regarding the pricing of related party financial transactions, includ-
ing financial and performance guarantees, derivatives (including internal derivatives used 
in intra-bank dealings), and captive and other insurance arrangements. The work will be 
co-ordinated with the work on hybrids and CFC rules’17.
7 Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices 
that directly affect the functioning of the internal market [2016] OJ L193. The Directive 
elaborates thin-capitalisation rules in art 4. However, since the aim of this paper is to 
demonstrate the potential incompatibility of Croatian thin-capitalisation rules with EU law 
and not to suggest new ones, the author does not go into an in-depth analysis of the thin-
capitalisation rules proposed in the Directive.
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other typical rules regarding thin-capitalisation. Indeed, countries have a 
vast array of rules destined to curb thin-capitalisation, rules that can be 
classified into general and specific ones. The first would encompass rules 
containing the abuse of law principle or the arm’s length principle. The 
others are more specifically tailored to precisely fight thin-capitalisation. 
Here again, there are different variations of these rules that can be 
classified depending on different keys of classification, based on:
a) their material scope of application – rules determining a maximum 
amount of debt on which deductible interest payments are available and 
those determining a maximum amount of interest that may be deducted 
by reference to the ratio of interest (paid or payable) to another variable;8 
b) their territorial scope of application – rules applicable solely when 
the lender is situated in a country with low taxation or rules applicable 
when the lender is a non-resident or rules applicable when the loans are 
provided by both a resident or non-resident lender; 
c) the quality of debt – internal debt (intra-group), external debt, ex-
ternal debt but guaranteed by a dependant person (back-to-back loans). 
d) the criterion used for an appreciation of what is to be considered 
acceptable – a ratio of debt to equity, or a limitation to a percentage of 
EBITDA, or a limitation according to the arm’s length principle; 
e) whether, when the ratio is surpassed, the assumption of exces-
sive indebtedness is irrebuttable or rebuttable and, ultimately, having in 
mind the consequences; 
f) whether excessive interest payments are simply non-deductible or 
whether they are requalified as hidden dividend distributions.9
3 Croatian thin-capitalisation rules 
The Croatian ‘arsenal’ of measures destined to fight excessive inter-
est deduction consists of the following rules: 
1. Rules on penalty interest accumulated between associated per-
sons. Penalty interest is not deductible and it increases the tax base 
(article 7.1.8 CITA);
2. Rules on interest on loans granted by shareholders or company 
members (article 8 CITA and article 32 of the Regulation on Corporate 
Income Tax (hereinafter: Regulation on CIT)10);
8 OECD (n 1) 7. 
9 H Kruger, Liberté de gestion et endettement des entreprises en droit fiscal (LGDJ 2007) 288.
10 Regulation on Corporate Income Tax (Official Gazette 95/05, 133/07, 156/08, 146/09, 
123/10, 137/11, 61/12, 146/12, 160/13, 12/14, 157/14, 137/15) (Croatia).
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3. Rules on interest in transactions between associated persons – 
the application of transfer pricing rules on financial relations (article 14 
CITA and article 37 of the Regulation on CIT).
In this paper, we will investigate only measures two and three, be-
cause we deem the first measure rather self-explanatory. Indeed, in 
transactions including related parties, it would be very easy to deliber-
ately stall payments and thus incur penalty interest solely for the pur-
pose of reducing the tax base. Logically, the lawmaker did not allow for 
such payments to reduce the tax base. 
3.1 Rules determining a maximum amount of debt on which 
deductible interest payments are available11 
The application of these rules depends on the fulfilment of two cri-
teria. The first criterion concerns the person of the lender. Namely, the 
rules apply only if the lender is an associated person who has sufficient 
participation in the company of the borrower that can provide it with 
decisive influence over the decision-making process. The legislator fixed 
this participation to 25% of shares in the capital or voting rights. The 
2013 amendments to the CITA extend this rule to loans received from 
related persons. Persons are considered related if one person participates 
directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of another 
person, or the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the man-
agement, control or capital of the company. Loans given by third persons, 
but guaranteed by a person having the required participation, are also 
concerned by these rules.
The second criterion concerns the amount of loan that the lender 
who satisfies the first criterion needs to lend to the borrower in order 
to trigger the application of the thin-capitalisation rules. The amount of 
loan needs to exceed four times the shareholder’s share in capital or vot-
ing rights.
The fraction of interest payments that are deemed excessive is pure-
ly and simply not deductible by the borrowing company and it needs to 
be reintegrated into its tax base. These rules do not concern the interest 
on loans borrowed from a financial institution. 
Since the 2013 amendments, the rules also apply to loans granted 
by a non-associated person but guaranteed by an associated person, so-
called back-to-back loans, since companies could easily circumvent the 
application of thin-capitalisation rules by providing financing via a non-
associated person that would be guaranteed by the associated person 
covered by the rules. 
11 Art 8 CITA (n 2) and art 32 Regulation on CIT (n 10).
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The Regulation on Corporate Income Tax provides that if the inter-
est payments are taxable in the hands of the lender by Croatian personal 
or corporate income tax, the deduction of these interest payments from 
the borrower’s point of view is permissible. This is also a logical solution, 
for if it were not permissible the same amount of interest would be taxed 
twice – first via non-deducting the interest payments in the hands of the 
borrower and secondly by taxing them in the hands of the lender. 
If we were to analyse the Croatian rules in view of the classifications 
noted above, we could conclude that they belong to the rules whose terri-
torial application is limited solely to non-residents regardless of whether 
they are resident in a high or a low tax jurisdiction. The rules apply 
mostly to internal debts (intra-group) and to external ones insofar as 
these loans are guaranteed by an associated person. The criterion used 
to determine what constitutes an admissible amount of debt is an irre-
buttable ratio of debt to equity. Finally, the Croatian CITA stipulates that 
interest payments are simply deemed non-deductible and are therefore 
not requalified as hidden dividend distributions.
3.2 Rules determining a maximum amount of interest that may be 
deducted by reference to another interest rate12 
As was stated previously, Croatian law not only limits the deductibil-
ity of interest payments linking them to the amount of the debt granted, 
but also by limiting the interest rate. 
Therefore, to determine income from interest on loans granted by as-
sociated persons, the minimum calculated interest rate is the rate which 
would apply to non-associated persons at the time of granting a loan. 
However, to determine expenditures for interest on loans received by as-
sociated persons, the maximum interest accrued is recognised at the in-
terest rate which would apply to non-associated persons at the time of 
granting a loan. The interest rate referred to in those two paragraphs of 
article 14 CITA are determined and published by the finance minister, 
prior to the beginning of the tax period in which it is applied, taking into 
account that this interest rate is realised under comparable circumstanc-
es or would be realised in transactions between non-associated persons. 
If the minister fails to publish such an interest rate, the discount rate of 
the Croatian National Bank published in the Official Gazette will be ap-
plicable. These rules also apply to resident associated persons if one of 
the persons: 1. has a privileged tax status or is subject to profit tax at 
a rate lower than the stipulated rates or is exempt from the payment of 
profit tax; or 2. is entitled to carry forward the tax loss from previous tax 
periods.
12 Art 14 CITA (n 2) and art 37 of the Regulation on CIT (n 10).
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As stated above, these rules are actually rules on transfer pricing 
applied to financial relations. The position of these rules, immediately 
after article 13 CITA (transfer pricing rules), also indicates that article 
14 can be considered as an extension of the transfer pricing rules to fi-
nancial relations. Even though transfer pricing is not the main topic of 
this paper, the author deems it necessary to briefly explain this notion, 
as well as the arm’s length principle. Transfer prices are prices applied 
between associated enterprises. The arm’s length principle simply states 
that transactions between associated enterprises should not be distorted 
by the special relationship that exists between the parties. As such, the 
arm’s length principle is neutral.13
4 Compatibility with EU law 
In this part of the paper we will put the compatibility of Croatian thin-
capitalisation rules with EU law to the test. However, it is necessary first 
to explain that there is no explicit provision for legislative competences 
in the area of direct taxation in the EU Treaty. The legislation that exists 
on the taxation of companies has usually been based on article 115 of 
the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (hereinafter: TFEU), 
which authorises the Union to adopt directives on the approximation of 
such laws, regulations or administrative provisions of the Member States 
that directly affect the establishment or functioning of the internal mar-
ket. However, these require unanimity and the application of the consul-
tation procedure, resulting in very sparse legislation in the field. 
This does not mean that national lawmakers can legislate in the area 
of direct taxation without taking into consideration the boundaries set 
by EU law. This is the consequence of the so-called negative integration 
process. As opposed to positive integration – integration through positive 
action (coordination, common policy-making, approximation of national 
laws or even unification) – negative integration is integration through 
legally enforceable prohibitions of certain measures of Member States 
which violate the basis of a common market, such as cartel agreements 
and other distortions of competition and discriminatory, restrictive or 
protective government measures. The correlation between positive and 
negative integration can be explained as follows: 
... as long as no positive integration has been achieved in a cer-
tain matter, such as direct taxation, Member States remain in 
principle free to regulate that matter as they consider appro-
priate, except for matters exclusively attributed to the EC to be 
regulated, such as the common trade, agricultural and fisheries 
13 OECD, ‘Transfer Pricing Legislation: A Suggested Approach (OECD 2011) 3. 
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policies. But this national sovereignty is restricted by negative 
integration, i.e. by the EC Treaty prohibitions, especially the free 
movement rules and the competition rules of which the ban on 
State aid to undertakings is the most important one in the field 
of taxation.14
In the Schumacker case, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(hereinafter: CJEU) said: ‘Although, as Community law stands at pre-
sent, direct taxation does not as such fall within the purview of the Com-
munity, the powers retained by the Member States must nevertheless 
be exercised consistently with Community law’.15 This means that the 
exercise of the national competences in the field of tax law is subject to 
boundaries that EU law imposes and which are related to the existence of 
articles on free movement (articles 28 – 37 and 45 – 66 TFEU). 
According to Union law, tax advantages need to be granted ensuring 
equal treatment. However, for this principle of equal treatment to apply, 
two situations need to be comparable. When talking about the notion of 
discrimination, the Court determines it in the following manner: ‘It is also 
settled law that discrimination can arise only through the application of 
different rules to comparable situations or the application of the same 
rule to different situations’.16 Discrimination can have two forms – direct 
discrimination – based on nationality,17 and indirect discrimination – all 
forms of discrimination which, by the application of other criteria of dif-
ferentiation, lead in fact to the same result.18
In the case of companies, nationality is determined based on the 
location of the company’s seat.19 For instance, in the cases Royal Bank of 
Scotland (RBS)20 and Commission v France,21 national tax measures were 
14 BJM Terra and PJ Wattel, European Tax Law (4th edn, Kluwer International Law 2005) 
28.
15 Case C–279/93  Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v Roland Schumacker [1995] ECR I–00225, 
para 21.
16 Case C–279/93  Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v Roland Schumacker [1995] ECR I–00225, 
para 30; Case C-80/94 GHEJ Wielockx v Inspecteur der Directe Belastingen [1995] ECR 
I-02493 para 17; and Case C-107/94 PH Asscher v Staatssecretaris van Financiën [1996] 
ECR I-03089, para 40.
17 Case C-270/83 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic [1986] ECR 
00273. For a comment, see T O’Shea, ‘Freedom of Establishment Tax Jurisprudence: Avoir 
Fiscal Re-visited’ (2008) 17(6) EC Tax Review 259. Also see Case C-311/97 Royal Bank of 
Scotland [1999] ECR I-02651. 
18 M Dahlberg, Direct Taxation in Relation to the Freedom of Establishment and the Free 
Movement of Capital (Kluwer Law 2005) 67.
19 Case C-1/93 Halliburton Services BV v Staatssecretaris van Finances [1994] ECR I–1137, 
para 20.
20 Case C-311/97 Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Elliniko Dimosio [1999] ECR I–2651.
21 Case C-270/83 Commission v France [1986] ECR 273.
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found to be in breach of article 49. They were discriminatory because the 
tax advantage was granted to companies only if they had their registered 
seat in the State granting the tax advantage. However, here there is a 
difference between countries applying the so-called siège réel doctrine, 
according to which a company has its residence in the country in which it 
has a real economic establishment and is not just being incorporated ‘on 
paper’. In a country which applies this doctrine, measures which make a 
difference based on residency, which does not necessarily coincide with 
the place of incorporation, are deemed to be indirectly discriminatory 
and can therefore be justified not only based on the express derogations 
found in article 52, but also based on objective justifications. On the 
other hand, discriminatory measures in countries in which residency is 
determined by the place of their incorporation are deemed to be directly 
discriminatory and can thus be justified solely by one of the express dero-
gations (the RBS case). 
To avoid some of the problems arising from the RBS line of case law, 
the Court has tended to use the formula based on removing hindrances, 
obstacles or restrictions to the freedom of establishment which can be 
justified by more appropriate justifications.22 
That being said, there is ongoing concern about the inherent tension 
between the ‘restriction’ approach and the taxation regimes in Member 
States which differ significantly in respect of tax rates, tax bases and ac-
counting rules. Indeed the sole fact that a Member State has higher tax 
rates than another Member State makes it less attractive for a foreign 
company to establish itself in that particular State.23 
On the other hand, taxation systems are inherently discriminatory. 
For instance, both international tax law and Union law recognise the 
principle of territoriality, namely that resident companies are taxed on 
their worldwide profits, while non-resident companies are taxed only on 
profits arising from sources located in that taxing state (limited taxation). 
So, the question remains how to reconcile these opposing principles? 
In an opinion in the ACT Group Litigation,24 Advocate General Geelhoed 
offered a potential solution. He suggested a distinction between ‘quasi-
restrictions’ and ‘true restrictions’. The first ones are those that result 
inevitably from the coexistence of national tax systems because of: 1) the 
existence of parallel administrative compliance burdens; 2) the dispari-
ties between national tax systems; and 3) the necessity to divide tax juris-
22 M Gammie, ‘The Role of the European Court of Justice in the Development of Direct Dis-
crimination in the European Union’ (2003) 57 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documenta-
tion 86.
23 C Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU (3rd edn, OUP 2010) 336 and 337.
24 Case C-374/04 ACT Group Litigation [2007] ECR I-11673.
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dictions. If the different treatment of the comparator companies is based 
on the internationally accepted distinction in tax law between residents 
and non-residents, then the matter should fall outside the Treaty prohi-
bition on discrimination. Indeed, these restrictions can sometimes pro-
vide companies with advantages. The other restrictions go beyond what 
is the inevitable consequence of the coexistence of national tax systems. 
He considers that because the criteria determining direct tax jurisdiction 
are residence or source-based, this means that the truly restrictive na-
tional direct tax measures will in practice qualify as directly or indirectly 
discriminatory measures and that true restrictions should be analysed 
solely under the discrimination approach. In his opinion, if a rule is truly 
non-discriminatory, it will not breach the Treaties.25
One can conclude from the discussion above that this is a very com-
plex debate that has not produced a straightforward answer. National 
thin-capitalisation measures might potentially discriminate against other 
companies that are not nationals of the Member State in question since 
they often come into play only when the lending company is situated in 
another country. Therefore, in order to investigate whether there is po-
tential incompatibility with EU law, the case law of the Court in the mat-
ter of thin-capitalisation rules needs to be analysed. 
4. 1 Applicable freedom
Let us recall that the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Un-
ion provides for the following freedoms: free movement of goods (articles 
28 - 37), free movement of workers (articles 45 – 48), the right of estab-
lishment (articles 49 - 55), freedom to provide services (articles 56 - 62), 
and free movement of capital (article 63 - 66). The two freedoms that are 
relevant for the matter at hand are the right of establishment26 and the 
free movement of capital.27 
25 Barnard (n 23) 339 and 340.
26 Article 49 TFEU reads as follows: ‘Within the framework of the provisions set out below, 
restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory 
of another Member State shall be prohibited. Such prohibition shall also apply to restric-
tions on the setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member 
State established in the territory of any Member State. Freedom of establishment shall in-
clude the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons and to set up and 
manage undertakings, in particular companies or firms within the meaning of the second 
paragraph of Article 54, under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of 
the country where such establishment is effected, subject to the provisions of the Chapter 
relating to capital’.
27 Article 63 TFEU reads as follows: ‘1. Within the framework of the provisions set out in 
this Chapter, all restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States and be-
tween Member States and third countries shall be prohibited. 2. Within the framework of 
the provisions set out in this Chapter, all restrictions on payments between Member States 
and between Member States and third countries shall be prohibited’.
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In order to determine which freedom is applicable, it is necessary 
to establish their respective scopes of application, as determined by the 
TFEU and the relevant case law of the CJEU. For example in the Baars 
case, the Court concluded that:
It is clear from the second paragraph of Article 52 of the Treaty 
that freedom of establishment includes the right to set up and 
manage undertakings, in particular companies or firms, in a 
Member State by a national of another Member State. So, a na-
tional of a Member State who has a holding in the capital of a 
company established in another Member State which gives him 
definite influence over the company’s decisions and allows him to 
determine its activities is exercising his right of establishment.28 
Therefore, a person possessing a holding giving him a definite in-
fluence over the company’s decisions and allowing him to determine its 
activities is exercising his right of establishment. 
On the other hand, the Court defined the free movement of capital 
in the following manner: 
Although the Treaty does not define the terms ‘movements of cap-
ital’ and ‘payments’, it is settled case-law that Directive 88/361, 
together with the nomenclature annexed to it, has an indicative 
value for the purposes of defining the notion of capital move-
ments (see Commission v United Kingdom, paragraph 39, and 
Case C-222/97 Trümmer and Mayer [1999] ECR 1-1661, para-
graphs 20 and 21). Points I and III of the nomenclature annexed 
to Directive 88/361 and the explanatory notes which it contains 
indicate that direct investment in the form of a shareholding in 
an undertaking and the acquisition of securities on the capital 
market constitute capital movements within the meaning of Ar-
ticle 56 EC. By virtue of those explanatory notes, direct invest-
ment, in particular, is characterised by the possibility of partici-
pating effectively in the management and control of a company.29
Since the TFEU does not establish how the freedoms should interact 
if a national rule infringes both at the same time, it was up to the Court 
of Justice to decide which freedom is applicable. The Court adopted two 
28 Case C-251/98 C Baars v Inspecteur der Belastingen Particulieren/Ondernemingen 
Gorinchem [2000] ECR I-02787, para 22. For comments on the case, see A Lupo, ‘Reliefs 
from Economic Double Taxation on EU Dividends: Impact of the Baars and Verkooijen 
Cases’ (2000) 40(7) European Taxation 270.
29 Case C- 174/04 Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic [2005] ECR 
I–04933, para 27.
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approaches: a priority approach30 – an approach according to which the 
free movement of capital should be analysed only if the free movement 
of capital does not apply, and the parallel approach – according to which 
both freedoms should apply concomitantly.31 
Which approach prevails is not perfectly clear, either from the case 
law, or from the legal doctrine. However, and without going into the de-
tails of this rather extensive debate which would go beyond the scope of 
this paper, we will quote Professor Lang who says that: 
To summarize, it can be said that the Court has developed a new 
rule of priority. Whenever the discriminatory effects of a national 
provision are within the scope of two fundamental freedoms and 
one of them is predominantly affected, the other one is only af-
fected as an ‘unavoidable consequence’ and consequently does 
not apply. In recent case law, the Court confirmed this new con-
cept and emphasized that the purpose of the respective legisla-
tion is decisive.32 
The question of which fundamental freedom is applicable is not ir-
relevant. Indeed, free movement of capital applies also to relations with 
third countries, contrary to the other freedoms, including the right of 
establishment. Thus, the determination of the correct freedom is indis-
pensable for the judgement of the compatibility of national thin-capital-
isation rules with EU law. We will now look specifically into the relevant 
case law regarding national thin-capitalisation rules and their compat-
ibility with EU law.
4.2 European cases regarding national thin-capitalisation rules 
There is a relatively substantial body of case law concerning thin-cap-
italisation rules. The first case was Langhorst-Hohorst.33 This case is highly 
relevant for our study since Croatian thin-capitalisation rules are fairly 
similar to the old German rules on thin-capitalisation that were tested by 
the CJEU. Article 8A of the Körperschaftsteuergesetz (German corporate 
income tax), in its version applicable from 1996 to 1998, reads as follows: 
30 Case C-436/00 X and Y [2002] ECR I-10829, paras 66-68.
31 Case C-157/05 Holböck [2007] ECR I-04051, paras 27-31. For a comment of this case, 
see S Hindelang, The Free Movement of Capital and Foreign Direct Investment: The Scope of 
Protection in EU Law (OUP, 2009) 106 and 107.
32  M Lang, Introduction to European Tax Law: Direct Taxation (Spiramus Press Ltd 2013) 
107.
33 Case C-324/00 Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH v Finanzamt Steinfurt [2002] ECR I-11779. 
See H Arbutina, ‘Potkapitaliziranje kao metoda izbjegavanja obveze poreza na dobit’ (2010) 
Zbornik radova s međunarodne znanstvene konferencije ‘Financiranje, upravljanje i re-
strukturiranje trgovačkih društava u doba recesije’ 239.
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Repayments in respect of loan capital which a company limit-
ed by shares subject to unlimited taxation has obtained from a 
shareholder not entitled to corporation tax credit which had a 
substantial holding in its share or nominal capital at any point 
in the financial year shall be regarded as a covert distribution of 
profits,
… 
2. where repayment calculated as a fraction of the capital is 
agreed and the loan capital is more than three times the share-
holder’s proportional equity capital at any point in the financial 
year, save where the company limited by shares could have ob-
tained the loan capital from a third party under otherwise simi-
lar circumstances or the loan capital constitutes borrowing to 
finance normal banking transactions.....34 
In this case, the Court declared the German regime contrary to EU 
law because it constituted a difference in treatment between resident 
subsidiary companies according to the seat of their parent company. The 
Court considered this to be an obstacle to the freedom of establishment 
which is, in principle, prohibited by Article 43 EC. The tax measure in 
question in the main proceedings makes it less attractive for companies 
established in other Member States to exercise freedom of establishment 
and they may, in consequence, refrain from acquiring, creating or main-
taining a subsidiary in the State which adopts that measure (para 32). 
The Court rejected the arguments proposed by the Government that 
the discrimination is justifiable because it was necessary to combat tax 
evasion or ensure the coherence of the applicable tax systems (paras 39 
– 42) or to ensure the effectiveness of fiscal supervision (paras 43 – 45). 
The Langhorst-Hohorst case had a profound impact on thin-capi-
talisation rules all over the European Union. Following this judgment, a 
number of companies in the United Kingdom decided to demand restitu-
tion or compensation for the non-deductibility of interest paid by British 
companies to other companies of the same group that were not resident 
in the UK, but rather in another Member State. Thus, the Court was 
asked to assess once again the compatibility of thin-capitalisation rules 
with EU law, this time in the case of British rules.35 
34 Kruger (n 9) 355.
35 Case C-524/04 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation v Commissioners of In-
land Revenue [2007] ECR I-02107 (Thin-Cap GLO). For comments on the case, see M Gam-
mie, ‘Pending Cases Filed by UK Courts II: The ACT, FII, and Thin Cap Group Litigations 
and the Marks & Spencer Case’ in M Lang (ed), ECJ: Recent Developments in Direct Taxation 
(Linde 2006) 323; FF Vandoren, ‘La Cour de justice européenne se prononce sur les règles 
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The test cases involved, first, loans granted to a UK-resident com-
pany by a company established in another Member State, and each of 
the companies belonging to the same group of companies, the ultimate 
parent company of which was also established in that other State. This 
applied to some of those test cases, namely those involving the Lafarge 
and Volvo groups, in which the lending company and the parent com-
pany were established in the same Member State, that is to say, in those 
cases, France and Sweden respectively. Other test cases involved a UK-
resident company which belonged to a group of companies headed by a 
parent company established in a non-member country, namely the Unit-
ed States of America or in another Member State but operating through 
a branch resident in a non-member country.
The Court held that the British legislation which was targeted only 
at relations within a group of companies primarily affected the freedom 
of establishment and should, accordingly, be investigated in the light of 
article 43 EC. This is because the national rules applied to UK-resident 
subsidiaries which were at least 75% owned, directly or indirectly, by 
a non-resident parent company or by another non-resident company 
which was also at least 75% owned, directly or indirectly, by that parent 
company, which of course granted them a definitive influence over the 
decision-making process of the subsidiary.
However, contrary to the decision the Court reached in the Lank-
horst-Hohorst case, in Thin-Cap GLO the Court said that a piece of legisla-
tion of a Member State may be justified by the need to combat abusive 
practices where it provides that interest paid by a resident subsidiary to 
a non-resident parent company is to be treated as a distribution only if, 
and in so far as, it exceeds what those companies would have agreed upon 
on an arm’s length basis, that is, the commercial terms which those par-
ties would have accepted if they had not formed part of the same group of 
companies. In the Lankhorst-Hohorst case, that requirement was not met 
by national legislation which did not have the specific purpose of prevent-
ing wholly artificial arrangements designed to circumvent that legislation, 
but applied generally to any situation in which the parent company had 
its seat, for whatever reason, in another Member State (para 37). 
A piece of national legislation can be regarded as proportional if the 
taxpayer is given an opportunity, without being subject to undue admin-
istrative constraints, to provide evidence of any commercial justification 
that there may have been for that arrangement and in the second place, 
de la «sous capitalisation» en Grande Bretagne’ (Fiscalité européenne 2007) no 149, 3; F 
Perrotin, ‘Un élargissement inattendu de la notion communautaire d’abus de droit’ (Petites 
affiches / La Loi / Le Quotidien juridique 2007) vol 66, 3; H Kruger, ‘Non-conformité d’une 
législation restreignant la faculté de déduire les intérêts versés à une société mère non rési-
dente’ (Revue de droit fiscal 2007) no 764,  45.
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that, where the consideration of those elements leads to the conclusion 
that the transaction in question represents a purely artificial arrange-
ment without any underlying commercial justification, the re-characteri-
sation of interest paid as a distribution is limited to the proportion of that 
interest which exceeds what would have been agreed had the relationship 
between the parties or between those parties and a third party been one 
at arm’s length (paras 82 et 83). 
In this context, it is for the national court to determine whether that 
regime gave them an opportunity to provide evidence as to any commer-
cial justification there may have been for the transactions, without being 
subject to any undue administrative constraints.
Having said that, it is necessary to underline that the British legis-
lation differed from the German one contested in Lankhorst-Hohorst in 
many aspects. Without entering into details, it is sufficient to say that 
the British rules did not make a reference to a fixed ratio, but rather to 
an ‘economically reasonable’ criterion. 
The third case, Lasertec,36 referred also to the German thin-cap 
rules. The Court gave its decision by way of a reasoned order, because 
it qualified that the reply to the question posed to the Court can be de-
duced from existing case law. The question that the national court posed 
was whether national rules, in accordance with which the loan interest 
paid by a resident capital company to a shareholder established in a 
non-member country who has a substantial holding in the capital of that 
company is, under certain conditions, regarded as a covert distribution 
of profits which is taxable in the hands of the resident borrowing com-
pany, are compatible with the provisions of the EC Treaty relating to the 
free movement of capital. In order to explain which freedom was indeed 
applicable, the Court affirmed that: ‘it is apparent from settled case-law 
that in order to ascertain whether national legislation falls within one or 
the other of the freedoms of movement, the purpose of the legislation at 
issue must be taken into consideration’ (para 19). The rules stipulated 
that: ‘A significant holding exists where the shareholder holds directly or 
indirectly – also through a partnership – over one quarter of the share 
or nominal capital of the company limited by shares’ (para 4). For this 
paper, one needs to remark that this is the same percentage required by 
the Croatian legislation.
The Court went on: 
The treatment of a lesser holding which nevertheless confers a 
dominant influence over the company concerned as such a hold-
36 Case C-492/04 Lasertec Gesellschaft für Stanzformen mbH v Finanzamt Emmendingen 
[2007] ECR I-3775.
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ing shows, as stated by the Commission in its written observa-
tions, that, for the German legislature, the national measure at 
issue in the main proceedings is designed to apply, irrespective 
of a precise threshold, to holdings giving the holder a definite in-
fluence on the decisions of the company concerned and allowing 
him to determine its activities, in accordance with the case-law 
noted in paragraph 20 above …  (para 22). 
The Court then followed with the conclusion that: 
... this case falls within the material scope solely of the Treaty 
provisions relating to freedom of establishment (para 24)… As for 
the chapter of the Treaty relating to freedom of establishment, 
it does not include any provision which extends the scope of its 
provisions to situations involving nationals of non-member coun-
tries who are established outside the European Union (para 27). 
In the NV Lammers and Van Cleeff case,37 the facts were the follow-
ing: the Belgian subsidiary was created on 25 July 1991. The nominated 
directors were the two shareholders of the Belgian subsidiary as well as 
the parent company Lammers & Van Cleeff BV, located in the Nether-
lands. The subsidiary paid interest to the parent company Lammers & 
Van Cleeff BV for a loan that it received from the parent company. How-
ever, the national legislation provided for a different treatment of interest 
payments paid to a company which acted as a director, dependant on 
whether or not this company had its residence in Belgium. Indeed, the 
legislation at hand did not provide for a recharacterisation of interest 
into dividends when the lender was a resident company, even if one of 
the two limits posed in article 18, first paragraph, 3°, of CIR (Code des 
revenues 1992) was met. On the other hand, if the interest payments 
were made to a non-resident company, the limits were applicable and 
the payment would be requalified into dividends and taxed accordingly. 
Therefore, companies directed by a non-resident company were treated 
less favourably.
Once again, the Court reiterated that a difference in treatment be-
tween companies based on the residence of the company acting as the 
administrator and providing the loan constitutes a restriction of the free-
dom of establishment. Since the provisions regarding the freedom of es-
tablishment oppose the application of such a national legal provision, 
there was no need to further investigate whether the free movement of 
capital was also applicable. 
37 Case C-492/04 Lammers & Van Cleeff NV v Belgische Staat ECR [2008] I-00173.
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It has not been until very recently that the Court sanctioned for 
the first time thin-capitalisation rules because they infringed the free 
movement of capital. This happened in the case  Itelcar – Automóveis de 
Aluguer Lda.38 Here, the Portuguese company Itelcar received a loan from 
an associated company GE Capital, resident in the USA.
The Portuguese rules provided that if the amount of the loan sur-
passes twice the amount of the borrower’s participation in the company’s 
capital, the interest linked to that part of the loan is not to be treated as 
deductible (paras 1 – 3). 
The Portuguese rules allowed the taxpayer to prove that it would 
have been possible to obtain such a loan from a third independent party. 
Itelcar was in the position of having an excessive debt in the fiscal years 
2004 – 2007 and it was not able to prove that it could get the same 
amount of debt from an independent entity. It also could not prove that 
the difference in the interest rate was respecting the arm’s length prin-
ciple.
The referring court asked whether the national legislation was not 
opposing article 63 TFEU (TEC 56) and article 65 TFEU (TEC 58), in other 
words the free movement of capital. Once again, until this case, the Court 
had never assessed the rules in the light of the free movement of capital, 
but rather the freedom of establishment. When deliberating on which 
freedom was applicable, the Court stated that, in relation to national 
legislation on the tax treatment of dividends originating in a non-member 
country, it is sufficient to examine the purpose of that legislation in or-
der to determine whether the tax treatment falls within the scope of the 
Treaty provisions on the free movement of capital. Since the Treaty chap-
ter on freedom of establishment does not contain any provision which 
extends the application of its provisions to situations concerning the es-
tablishment of a company of a Member State in a non-member country or 
the establishment of a company of a non-member country in a Member 
State, such legislation cannot fall within the scope of article 43 EC (para 
16). The Court has also held that, where it is apparent from the purpose 
of such national legislation that it can apply only to those shareholdings 
which enable the holder to exert a definite influence on the decisions of 
the company concerned and to determine its activities, neither article 43 
EC nor article 56 EC may be relied upon (para 17). 
On the other hand, national rules relating to the tax treatment of 
dividends coming from a non-member country which do not apply exclu-
sively to situations in which the parent company exerts decisive influence 
over the company paying the dividends must be assessed in the light of 
38 Case C-282/12 Itelcar – Automóveis de Aluguer Lda v Fazenda Pública ECLI:EU:C:2013:629.
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article 56 EC. A company resident in a Member State may therefore rely 
on that provision in order to call into question the legality of such rules, 
irrespective of the size of its shareholding in the company paying divi-
dends established in a non-member country (para 18). 
Since the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings did 
not relate only to situations in which the lending company of a non-mem-
ber country exerts a definite influence over the resident borrowing com-
pany by reason of its shareholding in that company, a resident company 
may, irrespective of whether the lending company of the non-member 
country has a shareholding in it, or of the size of any such shareholding, 
rely upon the Treaty provisions on the free movement of capital in order 
to call into question the legality of such national rules (paras 19 – 23).39
Concerning potential justifications of such a restriction, the Court 
concluded that it should be recalled that, according to settled case law, 
a national measure restricting the free movement of capital may be justi-
fied where it specifically targets wholly artificial arrangements which do 
not reflect economic reality and the sole purpose of which is to avoid the 
tax normally payable on the profits generated by activities carried out on 
the national territory (para 34). 
By providing that certain interest paid by a resident company to a 
company established in a non-member country, with which it has special 
relations, is not to be deductible for the purposes of determining the tax-
able profit of that resident company, rules such as those at issue in the 
main proceedings are capable of preventing practices whose sole purpose 
is to avoid the tax that would normally be payable on profits generated by 
activities undertaken in the national territory. It follows that such rules 
are an appropriate means of attaining the objective of combating tax eva-
sion and avoidance.
Even though the Court accepted the justification, it deemed that 
the rules at hand went beyond what was necessary to attain the objec-
tive. The reason for this was that the term ‘special relations’, as defined 
in article 58(4) of the Portuguese Corporation Tax Code (Código do Im-
posto sobre o Rendimento das Pessoas Colectivas; hereinafter: CIRC), 
encompasses situations that do not necessarily involve the lending com-
pany of a non-member country holding shares in the resident borrowing 
company. Where there is no such shareholding, the effect of the method 
for calculating the excess indebtedness laid down in article 61(3) CIRC 
is that any credit arrangement between those two companies falls to be 
regarded as excessive (paras 35 and 41).
39 In particular, the situations listed in art 58(4)(g) CIRC, which relate to the commercial, 
financial, business or legal relationships between the companies in question, do not neces-
sarily involve the lending company holding shares in the borrowing company.
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5 Assessing the compatibility of the Croatian thin-capitalisation 
rules with EU law 
After having depicted the horizon of the settled case law of the Court 
of the European Union, we shall now assess the compatibility of the Cro-
atian legislation in view of what has been said.
As stated above, the Croatian Regulation on Corporate Income Tax 
prescribes that if the interest payments that are treated as non-deduct-
ible are taxed in the hands of the lender with the Croatian personal or 
corporate income tax, deduction of these interest payments in the hands 
of the borrower will then be allowed (paragraphs 5 and 6 of article 32). 
In other words, if the lender is a Croatian resident, subject to Croatian 
personal or corporate income tax, the borrowing company will be allowed 
to deduct the interest that was initially deemed excessive, according to 
article 8 CITA.
On the other hand, if the lending company is a non-resident com-
pany, the interest cannot be considered as deductible in the hands of the 
borrower. This way of taxation is coherent with the aim of thin-capitalisa-
tion rules, which is to prevent the erosion of the Croatian tax base towards 
foreign countries. Indeed, this would occur if Croatia allowed the deduc-
tion of excessive interest payments that would then subsequently be taxed 
in a foreign country (the country where the lending company is resident). 
However, this provision seems to introduce a different treatment of 
interest payments made to parent companies based on whether the latter 
have Croatian or foreign residency. Indeed, only Croatian parent compa-
nies can be subject to Croatian tax, as opposed to non-resident parent 
companies that are not. 
This kind of difference in treatment between Croatian subsidiaries 
based on whether they have resident or non-resident parent companies 
creates a restriction to the freedom of establishment, in principle pro-
hibited by article 49 TFEU (ex article 43 TEC). The Croatian provision 
renders less attractive the exercise of this fundamental freedom by non-
resident companies which can then as a consequence choose to establish 
themselves elsewhere. 
According to the settled case law of the Court of Justice, although 
direct taxation falls within their competence, Member States must none-
theless exercise that competence consistently with Community law and, 
in particular, avoid any discrimination on grounds of nationality (Lang-
horst-Hohorst, para 26), which is precisely the case with the present Cro-
atian rules. 
It is the opinion of the author that the Court would not be convinced 
by justifications based on the risk of tax evasion because the legislation 
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at issue should have the specific purpose to prevent wholly artificial ar-
rangements designed to circumvent the national legislation and not ap-
ply to any situation in which the parent company has its seat, for what-
ever reason, outside Croatia. Such situations do not in themselves entail 
a risk of tax evasion, since such a company will in any event be subject 
to the tax legislation of the State in which it is established (Langhorst-
Hohorst, para 37). 
It follows that the Croatian thin-capitalisation regime, as it is con-
ceived today, is not compatible with EU law and that Croatia risks being 
sanctioned if the measure is contested before the Court of Justice. 
6 Rendering the Croatian legislation compatible with EU law 
In order to see how the Croatian legislation could be rendered com-
patible with EU law, the author proposes to conduct a survey of the reac-
tions of other EU lawmakers following the Lankhorst-Hohorst case.40 
The Netherlands,41 Denmark, France42 and Germany43 chose to ap-
ply thin-capitalisation rules to resident taxpayers, as well as non-resi-
dent ones. Spain (until 2012) and Portugal chose to take a different route. 
They restricted the application of these rules solely to situations where 
the lender was a resident in a third (non-EU) country. Finally, Great 
Britain chose to entirely eliminate thin-capitalisation rules and to apply 
rules on transfer pricing, i.e. the arm’s length principle, also on financial 
relations between associated enterprises. 
Which of these solutions would best suit Croatian law? If the main 
aim is to preserve to the maximum the Croatian tax base, whilst render-
ing the legal norm compatible with EU law, the best option would be to 
40 B Terra and P Wattel, European Tax Law (5th edn, Kluwer Law International 2008) 585.
41 The Netherlands chose to do it even prior to the Lankhorst-Hohorst case, following the 
Bosal Holding case, Case C-168/01 Bosal Holding BV contre Staatssecretaris van Financiën 
[2003] ECR I-09409.
42 The provisions of the new article 212 II of the French General Tax Act – Code général des 
impôts (CGI) apply to all companies and organisms which are subject to corporate income 
tax by law or upon option.
43 This was the solution adopted by the German legislator. First, the rules against thin-
capitalisation were modified in the sense that they covered national and cross-border situ-
ations. According to the modified article 8A of the German Körperschaftsteuergesetz, all 
interest payments above EUR 250,000 paid out to shareholders having more than 25% of 
the capital or voting rights were reclassified as dividends if the ratio of debt to equity was 
above 1.5:1. However, dividend payments made to resident parent companies were 95% tax 
exempt, as opposed to dividends paid to non-resident parent companies which were taxed 
at 25% withholding tax. In this sense, the new rule still had a discriminatory effect. In 2008, 
the German legislator made a drastic turn and replaced the entire rules with a completely 
new type of rules, called interest barrier rules (Zinsschränke). N Soshnikov, ‘Structure and 
Elements of National Thin Capitalization Rules’ in C Massoner, A Storck and B Sturzlinger 
(eds), International Group Financing and Taxes (Linde Verlag 2012) 61.
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simply exclude the application of Croatian thin-capitalisation rules in 
relation to companies that are resident in the European Union. 
Let us first examine this option. Some scholars, notably Rita de la 
Feria, consider that the decision brought in the Langhorst-Hohorst case 
left the given countries with the aforementioned three options – to extend 
the application of thin-capitalisation rules to purely national situations; 
to exclude their application in relations with companies resident in the 
European Union; or to simply abolish the rules entirely. However, Rita de 
la Feria considers that the Itelcar case removed the second possibility for 
the Member States:
 It is now clear that the route followed by Portugal and Spain is 
regarded as incompatible with EU law. EU member states only 
have two options: either to extend the scope of application of thin 
capitalization rules in order to include resident companies; or 
abolish the rules. Applying them only to non-EU countries is no 
longer acceptable.44
It seems to us that this statement needs to be nuanced, or at least 
regarded in the context and light of the structure of the Portuguese rules 
on thin-capitalisation. Let us recall that these rules were tested against 
the free movement of capital and that the reason the Court decided that 
the rules were incompatible with EU law was that the Portuguese rules 
did not apply solely to situations in which the lending company from 
another Member State had a decisive participation in the borrowing com-
pany. Since this particular freedom applies also in relation to third coun-
tries, it was obvious that the Portuguese rules were no longer compatible 
with EU law. 
On the other hand, the Lasertec case tells us that, in order to deter-
mine which freedom takes precedence, it is necessary to take into consid-
eration the objective of the legislation at hand (para 19).45 In the concrete 
case, German law defined that the national thin- capitalisation rule was 
applicable to circumstances in which the non-resident lending company 
has a substantial holding, directly or indirectly, in the nominal capital of 
the resident borrowing company, namely a holding of over 25%. This is 
also the case in Croatian law. 
44 R de la Feria, cited in an article by R Jackson, ‘Application of Portugal’s Former Thin Cap 
Rules to Only Third Countries Violated EU Law, ECJ Says’ (Tax Analysts, 8 October 2013).
45 ‘The treatment of a lesser holding which nevertheless confers a dominant influence over 
the company concerned as such a holding shows, as stated by the Commission in its writ-
ten observations, that, for the German legislature, the national measure at issue in the 
main proceedings is designed to apply, irrespective of a precise threshold, to holdings giving 
the holder a definite influence on the decisions of the company concerned and allowing him 
to determine its activities, in accordance with the case-law noted in paragraph 20 above … ’ 
(para 22).
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The Court concluded that: 
[T]his case falls within the material scope solely of the Treaty pro-
visions relating to freedom of establishment (para 24) 
… 
As for the chapter of the Treaty relating to freedom of establish-
ment, it does not include any provision which extends the scope 
of its provisions to situations involving nationals of non-member 
countries who are established outside the European Union... 
(para 27).
It follows that national thin-capitalisation rules which apply only 
when the lending company has a decisive influence in the borrowing 
company need to be tested exclusively in the light of the freedom of es-
tablishment. The Croatian rules also require a decisive participation of 
at least 25% in the capital or voting rights of the borrowing company and 
thus one can argue that these rules can be regarded solely in the light of 
the freedom of establishment and not the free movement of capital. 
Having said that, it remains unclear whether the fact that the Croa-
tian law was amended in 2013, by extending the thin-capitalisation rules 
to loans given out by related persons, or loans that are given by third 
persons, but guaranteed by the persons having the required participation, 
changes the outcome. Let us recall that persons are considered related 
if one person participates directly or indirectly in the management, con-
trol or capital of another person, or the same persons participate directly 
or indirectly in the management, control or capital of the company. One 
could argue that not all these cases require a decisive participation, or 
substantive shareholding. On the other hand, one could also argue that 
these requirements are set in order to combat situations in which a per-
son having a decisive participation is using other entities over which it has 
an influence to circumvent the application of thin-capitalisation rules. 
The Itelcar case does not seem to give a straight answer to this ques-
tion, since the Court investigated the terms of the legislation in the fol-
lowing manner: 
So far as concerns the rules at issue in the main proceedings, the 
term ‘special relations’, as defined in Article 58(4) of the CIRC, 
does not – as Itelcar and the European Commission observe – 
relate only to situations in which the lending company of a non-
member country exerts a definite influence, within the meaning 
of the abovementioned case-law of the Court, over the resident 
borrowing company by reason of its shareholding in that com-
pany. In particular, the situations listed in Article 58(4)(g) of the 
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CIRC, which relate to the commercial, financial, business or legal 
relationships between the companies in question, do not neces-
sarily involve the lending company holding shares in the borrow-
ing company (para 20). 
At the hearing, the Portuguese government stated, however, in reply 
to a question put by the Court, that the rules apply only to situations in 
which the lending company has a direct or indirect shareholding in the 
borrowing company.
The Court then stated: 
Nevertheless, even if the application of the rules at issue in the 
main proceedings is confined to situations concerning dealings 
between a borrowing company and a lending company holding at 
least 10% of the shares or voting rights in the borrowing compa-
ny, or between companies in which the same shareholders have 
such a holding, as contemplated in Article 58(4)(a) and (b) of the 
CIRC, it is clear that a holding of such a size does not necessarily 
imply that the holder exerts a definite influence over the deci-
sions of the company of which it is a shareholder (para 22).
Indeed, the Portuguese rules seemed to have been sanctioned in the 
light of the free movement of capital due to the mere fact that the par-
ticipation required for the application of these rules was only 10%, and 
not necessarily because the term ‘special relation’ encompassed relations 
that did not require a shareholding in the borrowing company.
However, the Court concluded that: 
It follows that a resident company may, irrespective of whether 
the lending company of the non-member country has a share-
holding in it, or of the size of any such shareholding, rely upon 
the Treaty provisions on the free movement of capital in order to 
call into question the legality of such national rules (para 23). 
Therefore, it seems that Croatian rules which do not apply solely 
to relations where the lending company has a decisive participation in 
the borrowing company could be sanctioned under the free movement of 
capital, which has a third country application. 
In that case, it seems that the only way that the Croatian legislator 
could render the Croatian rules compatible with EU law is to extend their 
application also to purely national situations. This solution implies that 
the unfavourable tax treatment of excessive interest would be applicable 
regardless of where the lending company has its residence.
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This solution has an unwanted consequence. It entices companies 
to have recourse to external debt instead of intra-group debt. The con-
ditions of these loans could be far less favourable than the intra-group 
ones would be, without there being a real threat of eroding the national 
tax base. As stated before, in purely national situations the interest de-
ducted in the hands of the borrowing company is subsequently taxed in 
the hands of the lending company.46 
This solution is also doubtful from the point of view of the European 
Commission: 
In the Commission’s view it would be regrettable if, in order to 
avoid the charge of discrimination, MSs extended the applica-
tion of anti-abuse measures designed to curb cross-border tax 
avoidance to purely domestic situations where no possible risk of 
abuse exists. Such unilateral solutions only undermine the com-
petitiveness of the MSs’ economies, and are not in the interest 
of the Internal Market. Indeed, as AG Geelhoed observed in Thin 
Cap such an extension ‘is quite pointless and indeed counterpro-
ductive for economic efficiency’. Moreover, it remains debatable 
whether such extensions can successfully bring all restrictive 
measures into line with the MSs’ EC Treaty obligations.47 
The last solution would be to apply the rules on transfer pricing 
and the arm’s length principle to financial relations, also in terms of the 
amount of the loan, and not only the applicable interest rate. This is the 
case with the law in Great Britain. After the Thin Cap GLO case, the Brit-
ish lawmaker modified the national rules in such a way that it started 
applying transfer pricing rules instead of thin-capitalisation rules to fi-
nancial relations between associated parties, including the amount of 
debt to which the deductible interest payments are linked. 
Effectively, rules that would be thus constructed would conform to 
EU law in the sense that the Court has already decided that the applica-
tion of the arm’s length principle constitutes an objective test, according 
to which it is possible to verify whether the financial relation at cause 
is a purely artificial arrangement. This test needs to be applied to both 
national and cross-border relations. The solution, following the applica-
tion of rules based on the arm’s length principle, would be to disallow the 
46 NP Bravo, ‘Thin Capitalization Rules and EU Law/Fundamental Freedoms in C Mas-
soner, A Storck and B Sturzlinger (eds), International Group Financing and Taxes (Linde 
Verlag 2012) 136.
47 Commission, ‘The application of anti-abuse measures in the area of direct taxation – 
within the EU and in relation to third countries’ (Communication) COM(2007) 785 final, 6.
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deduction of interest which exceeds the amount of debt that would have 
be lent in relations between unrelated parties.48
Croatian law already applies the rules on transfer pricing to financial 
relations.49 However, these rules are applicable only to the assessment 
of the interest rate and not the amount of debt granted. The application 
of the arm’s length principle, which is at the core of the transfer pricing 
rules, to the assessment of the amount of debt that would be granted 
between independent enterprises is not always easy to apply. Indeed, it 
presupposes the availability of information about the conditions under 
which unrelated parties would enter into a loan agreement.
Information concerning interest rates is publicly well known and it 
is sufficient to take a look at the easily accessible information pamphlets 
provided by the banks. On the other hand, the determination of the 
amount of debt which one person would allow to another independent 
person is a far more complex process. It takes into consideration the en-
tire financial situation of a person, including the default risk, insolvency 
risk and other factors. This determination process could be a difficult 
task for the tax administration and a rather dangerous process for the 
taxpayer, since he/she could not necessarily find information on loans 
from other comparable enterprises in order to contest the tax adminis-
tration’s results.50 This could be detrimental to the principle of legal cer-
tainty of the taxpayer. In this sense, the author suggests that the legisla-
tor keep a fixed ratio approach, at the same time allowing the taxpayer to 
prove that notwithstanding the fact that he or she is in a position of being 
thinly capitalised, the amount of debt would still have been granted, un-
der the same conditions, by an independent enterprise. 
7 Conclusion
The Croatian rule on thin-capitalisation is contrary to EU law and 
it should be modified. The analysis of the Court’s case law indicates that 
48 N Vinther and E Werlauff, ‘The Need for Fresh Thinking about Tax Rules on Thin Capi-
talization’ (2003) 12(2) EC Tax Review 105
49 For the determination of the income from interest on loans granted by associated per-
sons, the minimum calculated interest rate is the rate which would apply to non-associated 
persons at the time of granting a loan. For the determination of the expenditures for inter-
est on loans received by associated persons, the maximum interest accrued is recognised 
at the interest rate which would apply to non-associated persons at the time of granting a 
loan. One could argue that Croatia does not in reality apply the arm’s length principle be-
cause the interest rate referred to in this article is determined and published by the finance 
minister, prior to the beginning of the tax period in which it will be applied. If the Minister 
of Finance does not undertake any action, the applicable interest rate will be the discount 
interest rate fixed by the Croatian National Bank (art 14.3 CITA and art 37.2 of the Regula-
tion).
50 CP Knöller, The Efficacy of Thin Capitalization Rules and Their Barriers: An Analysis from 
the UK and German Perspective (2011) 39(6/7) Intertax 6/7, 334.
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the Croatian legislator has several options on how to make this rule ‘eu-
ro-compatible’. The option to restrain its application solely to relations in 
which one of the parties is resident in a third country certainly represents 
a step forward in rendering the rule more ‘euro-compatible’. However, 
since the rule is applicable also in situations in which the lender does not 
have a decisive participation in the borrowing company one could argue 
that this rule might be inspected under the scope of the free movement of 
capital, which has third country application. 
The second solution would be to extend the field of application also 
to purely national situations. Nonetheless, as stated above, this solu-
tion is somewhat controversial from the viewpoint of the European Com-
mission, since the extension of application to purely national situations 
which do not in reality represent a risk of abuse simply to avoid charges 
of discriminatory behaviour is deemed unproductive and even inefficient. 
The replacement of thin-capitalisation rules with transfer pricing 
rules which are based on the arm’s length principle seems indeed to be 
in line with the idea behind the case law of the European Court. Yet, this 
could provoke numerous questions in practice, elaborated above, which 
could even endanger the principle of the legal certainty of the taxpayer. 
This ought to be avoided at all cost. 
Finally, what possible solution could there be to this problem? One 
solution might be to replace thin-capitalisation rules with so-called inter-
est barrier rules. A thorough analysis of such rules is beyond the scope 
of this paper but could make for a topic of future research. 
